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A widely held notion is that freely floating exchange rates are excessively 
volatile when moving from fixed to floating exchange rates. We re-examine the 
data and conclude that the disparity between the fundamentals and exchange rate 
volatility is more apparent than real, especially when the Deutsche Mark, rather 
than the dollar, is chosen as the numeraire currency. We argue and demonstrate 
that in inter-regime comparisons one has to account for certain ‘missing 
variables’ which compensate for the fundamental variables’ volatility under fixed 
exchange rates. We show that IMF credit support is a crucial compensating 
variable. 
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1. Introduction 
The early proponents of flexible exchange rates (see, for example, Friedman, 1953, Sohmen, 
1961 and Johnson, 1958) viewed the fixed but adjustable Bretton Woods exchange rate 
arrangement as inherently unstable, because it failed to provide an effective adjustment 
mechanism. In contrast, a regime of flexible exchange rates was regarded as providing an 
automatic adjustment mechanism and flexible rates were therefore predicted to be inherently 
stable. However, the post-Bretton Woods and inter-war experiences with flexible exchange rates 
suggest that exchange rates when left to their own devices are inherently volatile. Of course, this 
does not mean that such rates are excessively volatile, since as Friedman recognized, if the 
underlying fundamentals are unstable then exchange rates are likely to be unstable as well:  
Instability of exchange rates is a symptom of instability in the underlying 
economic structure. Elimination of this symptom by administrative freezing of 
exchange rates cures none of the underlying difficulties and only makes 
adjustment to them more painful. (Friedman, 1953) 
However, the so-called exchange rate disconnect discussed in Obstfeld and Rogoff (2000) 
summarizes a widely held belief in the profession that exchange rates have indeed been 
excessively volatile with respect to traditional macroeconomic variables in the post-Bretton 
Woods period.
1 There are two aspects to this volatility disconnect in the literature, and we label 
these inter- and intra-regime volatility. Inter-regime volatility refers to the striking result that in 
moving from a system of fixed to floating exchange rates, the volatility of macroeconomic 
fundamentals, such as the money stock and income, does not change, but the volatility of the 
exchange rate does. The concept of intra-regime volatility refers to the view that in floating 
exchange rate regimes exchange rates appear to be excessively volatile with respect to the 
fundamentals. This paper focuses on the first issue of inter-regime volatility and leaves intra 
regime volatility to one side. 
The issue of inter-regime volatility has been made in a number of papers. For example, Baxter 
and Stockman (1989) examine the variability of output, trade variables, private and government 
consumption and the real exchange rate and are “unable to find evidence that the cyclical 
behavior of real macroeconomic aggregates depends systematically on the exchange rate regime. 
The only exception is the well-known case of the real exchange rate.” Flood and Rose (1995) use 
flexible price and sticky price variants of the monetary model to show that the volatility of their 
so-called ‘traditional fundamentals’ (money and income) remains roughly unchanged in the move 
from the Bretton Woods to the post-Bretton Woods regime, but that the volatility of virtual 
fundamentals (the exchange rate minus the interest rate differential) increases dramatically. Flood 
and Rose (1999) present a similar exercise in which they compare the volatility of fundamentals 
(including the interest differential) with exchange rate volatility per se for the Bretton Woods and 
                                                      
1The exchange rate disconnect also refers to the apparent difficulty in forecasting (the level of) exchange 
rates, although this is not uncontroversial (see, for example, MacDonald (2007).   3
the post- Bretton Woods period and again find that the volatility of the exchange rate dominates 
the volatility of the fundamentals.
2 
In this paper we propose to re-evaluate the inter-regime volatility issue. On the theory side we 
expand the monetary model of floating exchange rates to account for ‘missing variables’ in the 
case of regulated markets. Since, for example, the Bretton Woods regime was characterized by 
fixed exchange rates combined with trade and capital market distortions, an analysis of this 
regime has to take account of such distortions. 
A key novelty in our study lies in the examination of inter-regime volatility and, in particular, the 
behavior of an expanded set of fundamentals in the Bretton Woods and post-Bretton Woods 
periods. We shift the question from ‘why do we not observe more exchange rate volatility in 
fixed rate regimes given that standard fundamentals have similar volatility under both regimes?’ 
to ‘which variables absorb the fundamental volatility under fixed rates?’. We believe that asking 
the question in this way is insightful since there may be other fundamentals which absorbed the 
fundamentals’ variability in these regimes. If exchange rates are fixed, or managed, then it should 
be variables like trade restrictions, capital controls, international reserves or balance of payments 
support which adjust rather than the exchange rate. Marston (1993) showed, for example, that the 
interest differentials between the onshore and offshore Eurocurrency market under Bretton 
Woods was as large as one hundred basis points on an annual basis. Moreover, these differentials 
were highly variable. Furthermore, in these regimes there are often other regulatory aspects which 
should be incorporated into any empirical evaluation of the volatility of exchange rate 
fundamentals. We demonstrate that the volatility in the fundamentals is at least partly absorbed 
by these missing variables.  
The outline of the remainder of this paper is as follows. In the next section we present an 
extension of the monetary model. This model is designed to motivate the kind of traditional 
fundamentals used in exchange rate studies and the incorporation of the distortionary variables or 
wedges. The extended model shows how volatility of the traditional fundamentals is absorbed by 
the wedges rather than the exchange rate. In section 3 we empirically investigate the inter-regime 
volatility. The last section concludes.  
                                                      
2Duarte (2003) examines the effects of the exchange rate regime in the context of a dynamic general 
equilibrium model with nominal goods prices set in the buyer’s currency and incomplete asset markets. Her 
model predicts a sharp increase in the volatility of the real exchange rate when moving from fixed to 
flexible exchange rates. This pattern is not observed for other variables. Reinhart and Rogoff (2002) argue 
that at least part of the inter-regime volatility puzzle may be explained by using an inappropriate 
classification of the exchange rate regime. In particular, they show that in moving from the IMF’s 
classification of an exchange rate regime (as used in the studies of Baxter and Stockman (1989) and Flood 
and Rose (1995, 1999)) to one based on the factual properties of the regime, there was in fact much more 
flexibility of exchange rates during Bretton Woods and much more rigidity during the post-Bretton Woods 
period.   4
2. Theoretical background 
We adapt the standard flexible price monetary model to illustrate the relationship between 
fundamentals and the exchange rate. The incorporation of distortions drives a wedge between the 
exchange rate and the standard fundamentals. We go on to show how these may pick up the 
volatility in the fundamentals. We start with a modified version of absolute PPP:  
* SP P Ω = .                (2.1) 
Here the domestic (traded goods) price deflator P equals the price of the consumption bundle in 
foreign (traded goods) prices P
* times the distortion Ω and the exchange rate S. The distortion is 
responsible for the absence of absolute PPP (see Obstfeld and Rogoff (2000)) and signifies 
anything that drives or sustains a wedge between the domestic and foreign price levels. This 
includes tariff levies, export subsidies, transportation costs and the tariff equivalent of any quotas 
that drive a wedge between the foreign and domestic price levels. It also includes balance of 
payments support that is used to sustain current account deficits and postpone adjustment. 
A more elaborate exchange rate model including standard macro variables is obtained by 
combining the PPP relation (2.1) with the domestic and foreign quantity theory based equations 
for money demand respectively: 
φ λ PY R M = ) exp(  and  φ λ ) ( ) exp( ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ = Y P R M  .           (2.2) 
Taking the logarithm of (2.1) and substituting the home and foreign log transformed money 
demand functions gives the monetary model of the exchange rate:  
ω λ φ − + − = r y m s .             (2.3) 
Here  s = log(S) is the log exchange rate, m  = log(M/M
*) is the relative money supply, y = 
log(Y/Y
*) is relative income, r = R-R
* is the interest rate differential and ω = log(Ω) is the log of 
the wedge. Apart from the distortion,ω, the derivation gives the standard monetary approach 
exchange rate equation. More elaborate derivations based on individual agent optimization, as in 
Stockman (1980) and Lucas (1982), yield a pricing kernel. After calibration, the kernel reduces to 
specifications that are similar to (2.3) (see Mark (2001)). The specification (2.3) without the 
distortion matches the specification of the macro-economic fundamentals as in Flood and Rose 
(1999, p. 663). Omitting λr-ω from (2.3) gives the so-called traditional fundamental from Flood 
and Rose (1995). 
Note that the wedge in (2.3) enters with a negative sign, as in the case of relative incomes, since it 
keeps domestic prices artificially higher than the foreign prices thereby improving the terms of 
trade. If the wedge adjusts to counter the movements in the traditional fundamentals, it can 
compensate for the fluctuations in these other driving factors. How can we ensure that ω is 
chosen correctly? Some of the distortions to free trade, like the costs of transportation, can hardly 
react to changes in the fundamentals. But other distortions like the implicit price distortions 
induced by a quota or variable balance of payments support, and interest rate differentials, as the 
result of capital controls and official reserves or IMF credit, may be sufficiently flexible to absorb   5
the fundamentals’ movements and keep the spot rate constant.  The case of Germany in the 
1960’s and more recently the case of China shows that massive reserve hoarding, in combination 
with inward capital controls, can for extended periods of time take away the pressure for 
appreciation. While more difficult in the other direction due to limited means, devaluation has 
been postponed by employing reserves or foreign credit. To make a link to the empirical section, 
we compute the variance on both sides of the exchange rate equation (2.3): 
. 2 2 2 2 2 2 , , , , , ,
2 2 2 2 2
ω ω ω ω σ σ σ σ σ σ σ σ σ σ σ r y r y m r m y m r y m s − + − − + − + + + =        (2.4) 
On the one hand, under a free float without movements in the wedge, the volatility equation 
reduces to: 
. 2 2 2 , , ,
2 2 2 2
r y r m y m r y m s σ σ σ σ σ σ σ − + − + + =                 (2.5) 
In a fixed exchange rate regime on the other hand, (2.4) becomes: 
. 2 2 2 2 2 2 0 , , , , , ,
2 2 2 2
ω ω ω ω σ σ σ σ σ σ σ σ σ σ r y r y m r m y m r y m − + − − + − + + + =        (2.6) 
The received evidence is that there is little or no difference in the variability of the traditional 
fundamentals across regimes. If this is the case, equations (2.5) and (2.6) show that  
ω ω ω ω σ σ σ σ , , ,
2 2 2 2 r y m − + − ,            (2.7) 
has to bear the brunt of foreign exchange rate stabilization. These variance and covariance terms 
related to the wedge need to compensate for the volatility in the fundamentals in such a way that 
the exchange rate variability, σs
2, is nil. Under a dirty float, all terms in (2.4) will in general be 
non-zero. The next section tries to identify the missing variances and covariances in (2.7). 
3. Inter-regime volatility  
In this section we combine data from the Bretton Woods and post-Bretton Woods periods to 
address the issue of the importance of the wedge in explaining why traditional monetary 
fundamentals may not be enough to explain inter-regime volatility. As cross-country data on 
tariffs and subsidies are not widely available, we focus on balance of payments support as an 
important factor in postponing exchange rate adjustment.  
We start by examining the role of IMF support in suppressing exchange rate variability during the 
Bretton Woods period. We then go on to combine IMF support with traditional fundamentals, like 
money and income, to address the volatility issue. The volatility comparisons will be done using 
both annual and monthly datasets. Both datasets span the Bretton Woods and post-Bretton Woods 
periods and for European currencies include the period in which the ERM operated. This 
variation in regimes within the dataset follows Flood and Rose (1995) and is essential for an 
empirical investigation of inter-regime volatility. Throughout the empirical analysis, two 
countries will be used as numeraire: the United States (1) and Germany (2). Although the US was 
clearly the dominant numeraire currency in the Bretton Woods period, Germany’s importance 
increased in the post-Bretton Woods period, particularly after the formation of the ERM.    6
To the extent that central banks use foreign exchange reserves to stabilize the exchange rate, a 
tradeoff between exchange rate and reserve volatility would be expected. According to the 
monetary approach to the balance of payments, a divergence in the fundamentals (e.g. high 
domestic money growth) must be dissipated through a loss of reserves or the peg will have to be 
abandoned. Note, however, that we do not expect such a trade-off when the fundamentals do not 
diverge. 
There appears to be little in the way of empirical evidence supporting a trade-off between 
exchange rate and reserve volatility. Intuitively, the abandonment of a peg would be expected to 
lead to a reduction in reserve holdings and their volatility. However, Flood and Rose (1995) find 
that the volatility of reserves is generally higher following the collapse of the Bretton Woods 
system. We offer an explanation for this apparent absence of a tradeoff. A key reason why there 
may not be a stronger trade-off between reserves and exchange rate volatility is because IMF 
credit facilities distort the relationship. As IMF credit has often been used to replenish a country’s 
dwindling reserves, it masks the visibility of balance of payments problems in data on reserves. 
We therefore argue that any analysis of the trade-off between exchange rate and reserve volatility 
needs to take into account the role of IMF credit in supporting weak currencies. 
We first investigate whether IMF support is quantitatively sufficiently important to be included in 
an analysis of the volatility tradeoff. Table 1 shows the IMF's holdings of currency as a 
percentage of non-gold reserves for all countries during three subperiods. In general this 
percentage is highest during the Bretton Woods years and in the 1970s. With a few exceptions the 
percentage has declined from the 1980s onwards.
3 In the remainder of our analysis we look at the 
IMF holdings of a currency as a percentage of its IMF quota, to correct for the effect of quota 
increases. In their analyses of the volatility trade-off, Flood and Rose (1995) examined if the 
existence of non-gold reserves was an important source of fundamental volatility. They 
concluded it was not.  Our discussion here suggests that it is not sufficient to rely on non-gold 
reserves, rather Fund credit or Fund holdings of currency should be taken into consideration. We 
thus opt for Fund holdings of currency as a percentage of Fund quota and refer to this as our IMF 
variable. 
Figure 1 contains scatter plots of the change in the exchange rate (against the dollar, in dlog) 
versus, respectively, the change in our IMF variable (in dlog) in the top plot and the change in 
non-gold reserves (in dlog) in the bottom plot. The data are monthly and combine the experiences 
of 21 countries over the period 1960 to 1998 (see the data appendix for a list of countries). 
Figures 2 and 3 report some individual countries experiences. The scatter-plot for the IMF 
variable is shaped in the form of a cross, implying a highly non-linear dependence between 
changes in the exchange rate and the IMF measure. There thus exists a volatility tradeoff, though 
not a linear one. Either exchange rates or the Fund holdings of a currency are adjusting, but 
hardly ever are the two mechanisms for adjustment combined. In comparison, the scatter-plot for 
non-gold reserves has much less observations along the axes, suggesting the absence of a similar 
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that France had chosen to hold most of its reserves in gold instead of in foreign currency.    7
non-linear tradeoff between changes in the exchange rate and non-gold reserves. Here the two 
adjustment mechanisms are repeatedly used in tandem, or even occur in such a way that one 
partly compensates the other. This suggests that non-gold reserves and foreign exchange 
adjustments mostly acted in a complementary manner, while IMF credit was an almost perfect 
substitute for exchange rate movements.  This conclusion is only reinforced by the per country 
graphs in the Appendix. Based on the magnitude of IMF support (especially in the Bretton Woods 
period) and the cross-shaped pattern in the top plot of Figure 1, we have chosen the IMF variable 
as our candidate measure of the wedge ω . In the next two sections, we combine the IMF variable 
with traditional fundamentals to estimate  
3.1 Volatility comparisons: annual data 
An initial pass at the issue of inter-regime volatility by means of equations (2.5)-(2.7) we present 
in Table 2 the variances of two traditional macroeconomic fundamentals, namely the annual 
inflation and income growth differentials, along with the change in the exchange rate and the 
change in our IMF support variable across 19 countries (see Table A1 in the data appendix for a 
listing of countries). The use of annual data has the advantage of reducing short-term noise in the 
macroeconomic data while preserving the underlying signal. As this comes at the cost of a 
reduction in the number of observations, an analysis of monthly data is added in the next 
subsection. In the empirical analysis we have chosen inflation instead of money supply growth as 
our monetary fundamental because of the limited availability of money growth data for several 
countries in the 1960s. This is an important consideration in view of the small sample size of our 
annual analysis. We will redress this in the monthly analysis below, which includes money 
growth. The variances in Table 2 have the US and Germany as their numeraire countries and are 
calculated for three subperiods of comparable length (a Bretton Woods period, from 1961 to 
1971, and two post Bretton Woods periods, respectively from 1972 to 1983 and from 1984 to 
1998). Not only are these periods of equal length, but they also cover more or less the three 
regimes that prevailed: fixed exchange rates with adjustable peg supported by current and capital 
account restrictions and IMF credit, floating exchange rates but retaining balance of payment 
restrictions, capital controls and IMF support, and a complete free float.  
The first point to note from these results is that they confirm the point made by a number of other 
researchers, that in moving from Bretton Woods to the post-Bretton Woods period the volatility 
of standard fundamentals is very similar but the volatility of the exchange rate increases 
substantially. Note, however, that in the floating periods exchange rate volatility vis-à-vis the 
dollar is almost twice the volatility vis-à-vis the DM. This suggests that the volatility issue might 
be at least partly a dollar issue. We will return to this theme below. The results in Table 2 also 
indicate that there is a lot of volatility stemming from the IMF variable in the Bretton Woods 
period and, interestingly, that the average volatility of this variable decreases as we move into the 
first post-Bretton Woods period and decreases substantially in the period when capital controls 
were finally relaxed (1984-1998). There thus appears to be a clear trade-off between exchange 
rate volatility and volatility in IMF support as one moves between the regimes.    8
To explicate the inter-regime volatility we run regressions of exchange rate volatility on 
fundamental volatility as specified in equation (2.4). As we noted, under a fixed regime (2.4) 
collapses to (2.6) while in a undistorted free float (2.4) reduces to (2.5). If one has only data from 
these two pure regimes, a regression of σs
2 on fundamentals σm
2, σy
2, σr
2 and the wedge σω
2, 
should give a negative coefficient on the latter variable. The intuition for this is in Figure 1. Since 
under a pure float σs
2=0 and in a undistorted free float σω
2=0, the variances in both cases lie on a 
hyperplane of a dimension lower than if all variances are non-zero. One can show that this 
implies a negative sign on the σω
2 variable in a regression of exchange rate volatility on the 
volatilities of the fundamentals and the wedge.
4 Since a fair number of observations comes from 
the dirty float period in the 1970s and we have ommitted variables, we do not expect a perfect 
correspondence between the theoretical specification in (2.4) and the empirical results.  
In Table 3 we estimate equation (2.4) using the annual dataset by means of generalized least 
squares on the panel of 19 countries and for the 3 subperiods identified above. This yields a total 
of 57 observations. For both numeraire currencies, we report three different specifications, which 
differ depending on the inclusion of covariance terms and the IMF variable. Interest rates have 
been omitted from the regressions due to lack of data. Below, we will include interest rates in a 
smaller sample of monthly data. Table 3 yields some interesting observations. First, the 
explanatory power of the DM regressions is high compared to the results for the dollar. Whereas 
fundamentals explain over 50% of the variance of the exchange rate vis-à-vis the German 
currency, the explanatory power versus the dollar sticks at around 25%. The second observation 
relates to the sign and significance of the traditional fundamentals. For the German numeraire, the 
variances of inflation and income growth are positively and significantly related to the variance of 
the exchange rate, as one would expect from the monetary model. Together these two variances 
can explain 56% of the variance in the DM exchange rate. Inflation and income growth do much 
worse in the dollar regressions, where the variance of inflation is barely significant and the 
variance of income has the wrong sign.  
Turning to the variance and covariances involving the IMF variable, we observe that these are 
highly significant in the dollar regressions, but less so in the DM regressions. In all specifications, 
the variance of the IMF variable has a negative sign, as explained above. This corresponds to the 
visual impression from Figure 1, which illustrated the negative cross-shaped dependence between 
the exchange rate and IMF support, and also makes intuitive sense, as fluctuations in IMF support 
might serve to stabilize the currency.  
According to (2.4), volatility in IMF support should increase exchange rate volatility, ceteris 
paribus the volatility in other fundamental variables. It is only by covarying with the traditional 
fundamentals that IMF support should result in lower exchange rate volatility. A good example of 
how this works is the negative and significant coefficient of covar(Δp, ΔIMF) in the dollar 
specification. This can be interpreted quite easily: inflationary policies in the Bretton Woods 
period could be sustained longer without the need for an exchange rate adjustment when IMF 
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vector with the dependent variable in particular places.   9
support was made available. A positive covariance between Δp and ΔIMF thus reduces var(Δs). 
The negative sign of the coefficient of var(ΔIMF) has been explained in regression terms above. 
In addition, inflation and income may inadequately capture fundamental volatility. The 
significant negative sign for var(ΔIMF) may then pick up the covariances between IMF support 
and other missing fundamental variables. Candidates for such missing variables are, for example, 
fiscal policy variables and the current account. 
Summarizing our annual results, we conclude that the extent to which the volatility issue is a 
puzzle seems to depend on the choice of numeraire. The traditional fundamentals do well in the 
DM regressions, but badly in the dollar regressions. In addition, our IMF variable adds 
explanatory power to both the dollar and DM regressions. We will now investigate whether these 
results are upheld using a monthly dataset.  
3.2 Volatility comparisons: monthly data 
We use monthly data to derive annual standard deviations (based on 12 non-overlapping monthly 
observations) as our volatility measures. These are calculated only for complete years (i.e. years 
for which we have 12 monthly observations). In principle, this yields 39 (years) times 21 
(countries) = 819 observations, but in practice limited data availability reduced this number, see 
the bottom line of Table 4. For all variables, except IMF support, we take the first differences of 
the logs relative to the numeraire. See the data appendix for full details. 
Table 4 reports regression results for a large sample including all countries except Switzerland 
(for which the IMF measure was unavailable for most of the sample period). Due to the limited 
data availability for many countries, this regression again excludes interest rate volatility, but we 
can now use money growth instead of inflation. Table 4 shows that the variance of money growth 
is significantly related to exchange rate volatility in all specifications. Income volatility is 
unrelated to exchange rate volatility in all regressions. Similar to the annual results, the volatility 
connection holds better versus Germany than versus the US, both in terms of significance and 
explanatory power. For both numeraires, the coefficient of  covar(Δm, ΔIMF) is significantly 
negative, implying that IMF support can reduce or postpone the spill-over of a relatively high 
money growth into exchange rate volatility. This result resembles the significance of 
covar(Δp, ΔIMF) in the annual dollar regressions. It supports our interpretation of IMF support as 
driving a wedge between the volatility in traditional fundamentals and exchange rate volatility. In 
addition to the covariance term, var(ΔIMF) is significantly negative in the DM regressions. This 
also corresponds to the annual results; see the previous section for explanations for the negative 
sign of the coefficient of var(ΔIMF). A rerun of these regressions in which IMF support is 
replaced by non-gold reserves yields insignificant coefficients on the reserves variables, 
confirming the results of Flood and Rose (1995). 
In order to ensure that our regression results do not depend on the inclusion of small high-
inflation countries, Table 5 reports the results of a balanced panel regression for six large 
industrialized countries (Canada, France, Italy, Australia, the UK and either the US or Germany). 
Note that the number of observations is much lower than in the full monthly dataset. This set of   10
results shows the starkest contrast between the two numeraires. While the dollar regressions fail 
overall to establish a link between fundamental volatility and exchange rate volatility (except for 
the covariance term between money and income growth), the DM regressions are much stronger. 
All variances except var(Δy) are significantly related to var(Δs), including the variance of the 
long-term interest rate (var(Δil)).
5 In addition, three out of six covariance terms are significant at 
at least a 10% level. Given the self-imposed constraint of a cross-section limited to just six 
countries, this is a strong result. 
We conclude that the monthly data confirm the annual results. The fundamental connection is 
strongest in regressions which take the DM as the numeraire currency. In the majority of the 
regressions, there also appears to be a role for IMF support in explaining the wedge between 
fundamental and exchange rate volatility. That said, the explanation of currency volatility vis-à-
vis the dollar remains a challenge, although on the basis of our discussion in Section 2, access to a 
broader range of distortionary variables would likely help in explaining this volatility. 
4. Conclusions  
There exists a widely held notion that freely floating exchange rates become excessively volatile 
when moving from fixed to floating exchange rates. This paper reexamines the issue of inter-
regime volatility. We confirm the findings of a number of other researchers that in moving from 
fixed to floating exchange rates the variability of the standard macroeconomic fundamentals stays 
roughly unchanged, but that the volatility of the exchange rate changes considerably, suggesting 
an apparent mismatch. Using a simple extended version of the monetary model, we have 
demonstrated the importance of distortions in potentially explaining this mismatch and, 
specifically, how the volatility of standard fundamentals gets absorbed in fixed exchange rate 
regimes. In particular, we have shown that a country’s position at the IMF is an important source 
of compensating volatility, i.e. in suppressing volatility. Other distortions are also likely to be 
important in this regard, although unfortunately empirical data on these is limited or non-existent. 
In sum, we argue, and indeed demonstrate, that in cross-regime comparisons one has to account 
for the missing variables which compensate for the fundamental variables volatility under fixed 
rates. Moreover, we find that the volatility issue may be partly a dollar issue, as the link between 
fundamental volatility and exchange rate volatility improves markedly if we switch the numeraire 
from the dollar to the DM.  
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Data appendix 
The annual macro-economic data have been taken from the European Commission AMECO 
database, except the data on IMF support, which have been derived using data from the IFS cd-
rom (see below). The following countries are included: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, 
Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, 
Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom and the USA. 
The monthly macro-economic data have been taken from the IFS cd-rom. The data are monthly 
and start in January 1960. Due to the introduction of the euro in January 1999, the sample period 
ends in December 1998. The following countries are included: Australia, Austria, Belgium, 
Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Korea, Netherlands, 
Norway, Portugal, South-Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom and the USA. Our 
exchange rate measure is the bilateral period-average price of the US\ dollar (IFS line rf). We 
choose M1 (IFS line 34 or national definition) as our monetary aggregate. Where M1 was not 
available, we have chosen either a narrower (currency, IFS line 34A) or a broader aggregate (IFS 
line 35M or the national definition). To control for seasonality, we filter the money series by 
applying a one-sided moving average of the current observation and 12-lagged values (cf. Mark 
and Sul, 2001). The seasonally adjusted industrial production index (IFS line 66) is used for 
output; the CPI (IFS line 64) for prices. We use both long-term (IFS line 61) and short-term 
interest rates (IFS lines 60b/60c). Off-shore interest rates are available for a only few countries. 
Regarding reserves, we use non-gold reserves (IFS line 1L) and Fund holdings of domestic 
currency as a percentage of quota (IFS line 2F). The latter measure - denoted IMF - indicates the 
extent to which a country draws upon the IMF. Data on the exchange rate and non-gold reserves 
are available for all countries over the complete sample period. The same applies to the IMF 
measure, with the exception of Portugal (1962:7-1998:12) and Switzerland (1992:2-1998:12). 
The availability of other series is indicated in Table A1. All data have been checked and corrected 
for errors. With the exception of interest rates, the data are transformed by natural logarithms. 
Interest rates are measured as nominal rates divided by 1200.   13
 
Table 1: IMF currency holdings as % of non-gold reserves 
  1960-1971 1972-1983 1984-1998 
Australia 25 34 20
A u s t r i a  767
Belgium 33 11 25
Canada 26 37 44
Denmark 41 19 9
Finland 35 43 12
France 143 17 20
G e r m a n y  827
Greece 35 31 15
Ireland 11 7 7
Italy 12 54 9
Japan 19 5 5
Netherlands 36 9 13
N o r w a y  2 183
Portugal 12 75 30
Spain 38 12 4
Sweden 21 14 11
United Kingdom  337 46 24
United States  211 116 33
 
Average 59 26 15
Source:  IFS      14
 
Table 2: Volatility comparisons: average variances for 19 countries 
based on annual data 
  BW  Post-BW I  Post BW II 
  1961-1971 1972-1983 1984-1998 
$  numeraire     
var(Δp)  4.6 10.6 5.9
var(Δy)  8.5 8.4 4.7
var(Δs)  8.1 111.7 117.6
var(ΔIMF) (/100)  36.8 19.9 2.5
 
DM numeraire 
var( p Δ )  5.2 11.5 8.0
var( y Δ )  6.3 5.4 6.4
var( s Δ )  11.7 56.0 59.3
var( IMF Δ ) (/100)  32.8 15.3 2.5
Data source: European Commision and IFS. Variances are computed 
from 100*dlog x, where x is the variable under consideration. 
 
Table 3: Panel regressions: annual data 
  var(Δs) 
  vs $  vs $  vs $  vs DM  vs DM  vs DM 
            
constant 69.78  85.66  71.38  6.76  13.59  9.53 
 (2.86)  (3.79)  (2.49)  (1.20)  (3.09)  (2.31) 
var(Δp) 3.13













 (3.26)  (2.69)  (2.42)  (3.28)  (5.97)
  (1.67) 




   (3.85)  (4.30)    (4.73)  (1.25) 
covar(Δp, Δy)     7.01
**    2.85
** 
     (2.85)      (4.22) 
covar(Δp, ΔIMF)     -0.42
**    -0.036 
     (12.24)      (0.24) 
covar(Δy, ΔIMF)     -0.08      -0.031 
     (0.45)      (0.35) 
            
# observations  57  57  57  57  57  57 
weighted adj. R
2  0.24 0.24 0.27 0.56 0.65 0.61 
GLS estimation with cross-section weights, t-stats in parentheses are calculated 
using white cross-section standard errors. Balanced panel of 19 countries; 
variances and covariances calculated using annual data for three subperiods 
(1961-1971; 1972-1983; 1984-1998); 
* and 
** indicate significance at respectively 
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Table 4: Panel regressions: monthly data, full sample 
  vs $  vs $  vs $  vs DM  vs DM  vs DM 
          
constant  0.0004 0.0004 0.0004  0.0005  0.0005 0.0005 








  (2.41) (2.38) (2.50)  (3.81)  (3.67) (3.75) 
var(Δy) -0.005  -0.003  0.002  0.013  0.016  0.022 
  (0.78) (0.40) (0.29)  (0.68)  (0.95) (1.21) 
var(ΔIMF)   -0.0007  -0.0007    -0.002
** -0.001
** 
    (0.83) (1.03)    (3.37) (2.00) 
covar(Δm,Δy)     -0.078      0.886 
     (0.07)     (0.62) 
covar(Δm,ΔIMF)     -0.976
**     -1.653
** 
     (2.45)     (4.15) 
covar(Δy,ΔIMF)     -0.02      -0.016 
     (1.58)     (0.76) 
          
#  observations  680 680 680  672  672 672 
weighted adj. R
2  -0.013 -0.018 -0.010  0.09  0.11  0.12 
GLS estimation with cross-section weights, t-stats in parentheses are calculated using white 
cross-section standard errors. Unbalanced panel of 20 countries; annual variances and covariances 
calculated using monthly data from 1960.01 to 1998.12; 
* and 
** indicate significance at respec-
tively 10% and 5% levels. 
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Table 5: Panel regressions: monthly data, small sample 
  vs $  vs $  vs $  vs DM  vs DM  vs DM 
            
constant 0.0004  0.0004  0.0003  0.0004  0.0004  0.0004 
 (5.44)  (5.62)  (5.83)  (5.50)  (5.75)  (4.86) 




 (0.49)  (0.73)  (0.94)  (2.05)  (2.09)  (2.39) 
var(Δy) -0.010  -0.007  0.136
* -0.029
** -0.012 0.023 
 (0.85)  (0.47)  (1.83)  (3.22)  (0.96)  (0.34) 




 (0.80)  (0.95)  (0.95)  (3.28)  (3.31)  (3.30) 
var(ΔIMF)   -0.000  -0.000  -0.003
** -0.003
** 
   (0.93)  (0.00)    (2.75)  (3.47) 
covar(Δm,Δy)     14.02
**    -0.358 
     (2.59)      (0.08) 
covar(Δm,Δil)     -21.29      35.88
* 
     (1.43)      (1.84) 
covar(Δm,ΔIMF)     -0.486      -1.60
* 
     (0.87)      (1.70) 
covar(Δy,Δil)     -1.877      4.49
** 
     (1.06)      (2.03) 
covar(Δy,ΔIMF)     -0.086      -0.001 
     (1.36)      (0.02) 
covar(Δil,ΔIMF)     -0.902      -0.654 
     (1.18)      (1.02) 
            
# observations  216  216  216  216  216  216 
Weighted adj. R
2 -0.13  -0.13  -0.10  0.06  0.07  0.12 
GLS estimation with cross-section weights, t-stats in parentheses are calculated using white 
cross-section standard errors. Balanced panel of 6 countries (Canada, France, Italy, UK, Australia 
and either the US or Germany); annual variances and covariances calculated using monthly data 
from 1963.01 to 1998.12; 
* and 
** indicate significance at respectively 10% and 5% levels. 
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Table A1: Data availability, monthly dataset 
  M  Y P il 
Australia  60:1-98:12 M1 60:1-98:12  60:2-98:12
3 60:1-98:12 
Austria  60:1-98:10 M1 60:1-98:12  60:1-98:12  71:1-98:12 
Belgium 64:1-98:12  M1
1 60:1-98:12  60:1-98:12  63:9-98:12 
Canada  60:1-98:12 M1 60:1-98:12  60:1-98:12  60:1-98:12 
Denmark  60:1-98:12 M1 74:1-98:12  67:1-98:12  60:1-98:12 
Finland  69:1-98:12 Currency 60:1-98:12  60:1-98:12  92:11-98:12 
France  60:1-98:12 M1 60:1-98:12  60:1-98:12  60:1-98:12 
Germany  61:1-98:12 M1 60:1-98:12  60:1-98:12  60:1-98:12 
Greece 68:12-98:12  Currency  60:1-98:12  60:1-98:12  86:5-88:12 
         97:5-98:12 
Ireland  67:1-98:12 Currency 60:1-98:12  60:2-98:12
3 64:1-98:12 
       
       
Italy  62:1-98:12 M1 60:1-98:12  60:1-98:12  60:1-98:12 
Japan  63:1-98:12 M1 60:1-98:12  60:1-98:12  66:11-98:12 
Korea  60:1-98:12 M1 60:1-98:12  70:1-98:12  73:5-98:12 
Netherlands  60:1-97:12 M1 60:1-98:12  60:1-98:12  64:11-98:12 
Norway  60:1-98:12 Broad  M 60:1-98:12  60:1-98:12 61:9-80:7 
         80:10-98:12 
Portugal  76:1-98:12 Currency 60:1-98:12  60:1-98:12 60:1-64:4 
         76:1-98:12 
South-Africa 60:1-91:6  M1  61:1-98:12  60:1-98:12  60:1-98:12 
 92:1-98:12         
Spain  62:1-98:12 M1 61:1-98:12  60:1-98:12  78:3-98:12 
Sweden  61:1-98:12 Broad  M 60:1-98:12  60:1-98:12  60:1-95:12 
Switzerland  60:1-98:12 M1 63:2-98:12  60:1-98:12  64:1-98:12 
UK 60:1-98:12  M0
2 60:1-98:12  60:1-98:12  60:1-98:12 
US  60:1-98:12 M1 60:1-98:12  60:1-98:12  60:1-98:12 
1Currency (line 34a) until 79:12, thereafter M1. Ratio-spliced. 
2Broad money (line 
35L) until 75:5, thereafter M0. Ratio-spliced.
 3Interpolated from quarterly data.   18
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Figure 2: % Change in IMF holdings of currency (hor. axis) vs % change in dollar 
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Figure 3: % Change in non-gold reserves (hor. axis) vs % change in dollar exchange rate 
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